APPRENDI Vs. NEW JERSEY, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)

Since 1987, the American jury system has withered under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with courts using the preponderance of the evidence standard as the measure by which a defendant is held accountable under the jury trial system. While a handful of defendants have gone to trial under this new regime, made objection to judge found facts (sentencing enhancements) under the Sixth Amendment requirement that all facts be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. These Sixth Amendment challenges have fallen on deaf ears. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, had effectively eviscerated the federal jury trial system until the ruling and holding of Apprendi vs. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

The question presented in Apprendi is, “ whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S., at 469.

Answering in the affirmative the Apprendi Court held: “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 476.

The Apprendi Court reiterated that “[T]aken together, these rights indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to ‘a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citing] … Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 … (1995); … Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 … (1993); Winship, 397 U.S., at 364, …” Id., at 477.

The Apprendi Court held that “Winship’s due process and associated jury protections extend, to some degree, ‘to determinations that [go] not to a defendant’s guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence.” Id., at 484.

The Apprendi Court also endorsed the opinion it expressed in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-253 (1999), that “[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 490.

Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Apprendi, affirmed that the Constitution, “it means what it says. And the guarantee that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to… trial, by an impartial jury,’ has no intelligible content unless it means that all the facts which must exist in order to subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury.” Id., at 499.

Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion resonated with the teachings of Winship, that ‘[a]ll of these constitutional protections turn on determining which facts constitute the ‘crime’ –-that is, which facts are the ‘elements’ or ‘ingredients’ of a crime. In order for an accusation of a crime … to be proper under the common law, and thus proper under the codification of the common-law rights in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it must allege all elements of that crime must be proved to the jury (and, under Winship, proved beyond a reasonable doubt).” Id., at 500.

Finally, Justice Thomas made “clear that the common-law rule would cover the McMillan [v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)] situation of a mandatory minimum sentence (…, the visible possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes). … The mandatory minimum ‘entitl[es] the government.’ …, to more than it would otherwise be entitled (5 to 10 years, rather than 0 to 10 and the risk of a sentence below 5). Thus, the fact triggering the mandatory minimum is part of ‘the punishment sought to be inflicted.’ …. it undoubtedly ‘enters in the punishment’ so as to aggravate it, …, and is an ‘ac[t] to which the law affixes … punishment,’ ….Further,… it is likely that the change in the range available to the judge affects his choice of sentence. Finally, …, the aggravating fact raised the whole range – both the top and bottom. ….” Id., at 521-522.

Justice O’Connor, dissenting in Apprendi, forebode that “its decision will have the effect of invalidating significant sentencing reform accomplished at the federal and state levels over the past three decades. * * *[That] the most significant impact of the Court’s decision will be a practical one- - its unsettling effect on sentencing conducted under federal and state determinate-sentencing schemes. …, the Court does not say whether these schemes are constitutional, but its reasoning strongly suggests that they are not.” Id., at 549-551.

In U.S. v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655 (2nd Cir. 2001) (en banc), the Second Circuit held “pursuant to the Supreme Court’s instructions in Apprendi, because the quantity of drugs involved in a crime may raise a defendant’s sentence above the statutory maximum established in 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (C), quantity is an element of the offense charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841. …Apprendi, therefore, overrules our Circuit precedents, …, insofar as they held that, under 21 U.S.C. § 841, drug quantity resulting in sentence above a statutory maximum constituted a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense.” Id., at 663.

The Thomas court held that the error in that case was the “lack of congruence or consistency between, …, the crime charged in the indictment and found by the jury and, …, the crime for which the defendant was sentenced. … : either the defendant was improperly sentenced to a greater penalty than the one authorized by Congress for the crime of which he was justly convicted, or the defendant was improperly convicted, because the crime of conviction was not fully alleged in the indictment and found by the jury. ….

Viewing the error as an error in sentencing, the prejudice is clear. The facts alleged in the indictment and found by the jury supported a maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty years (240 months). ….

If, on the other hand, we proceed from the perspective that Thomas was properly sentenced …, but the error was in the conviction, then the proceedings below contained two defects. First, Thomas was convicted of a crime other than the crime alleged in the indictment. Second, the jury was not permitted to make a finding of an element of the crime for which Thomas was convicted – namely, drug quantity.” Id., at 669-670.

The court concluded that the error in the case was “more akin to a constructive amendment than a variance,” because the error “affected the defendant’s ‘substantial rights,’ [and] ‘seriously affect[ed]’ the fairness of the proceedings,” and was “not a case where a fact improperly found by a judge, rather than a jury, was ‘essentially uncontroverted.’ “ Id., at 671-672.

Lastly, the court found that the error seriously affected both the fairness and the public reputation of the judicial proceedings.

“Regardless of whether a sentencing error or a conviction error occurred in this case, any prejudice to the defendant will be cured by vacating his sentence and remanding for resentencing pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (C) to a term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty years.” Id., at 673.