| Dedicated
to the Resurrection and Reaffirmation of the Sixth Amendment
in the JURY TRIAL SYSTEM which reads in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense."
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL CLAUSE: All the facts (e.g.,
sentencing factors; aggravating factors; elements of
the offense) of the crime charged are to be determined
by a jury, not by a judge.
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: A defendant is guaranteed
the right to directly confront and cross-examine an
accusing witness.
COMPULSORY PROCESS CLAUSE: A defendant
has the right to have witnesses testify on his behalf
in a criminal or civil trial.
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAUSE: A defendant in a criminal
or civil matter has the right to counsel of his choice
and if he cannot afford counsel in a criminal case,
the court will appoint counsel to represent him. Otherwise
known as the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A.
The Right to Jury Trial; Confrontation; Compulsory
Process; Assistance of Counsel Clauses are all written
in the Constitutional Guarantee of the Sixth Amendment.
The Founding Fathers (Washington, Hamilton, Madison,
etc.) thought one of the most important provisions
of the Constitution to be the Jury Trial Guarantee.
The Jury Trial Guarantee is written into the
body of the Constitution and, into the Bill
of Rights.
The Founding Fathers included it in Article
III, §2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury,")
and the Sixth Amendment ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
")
and the Seventh Amendment ("In Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved,
").
The Founding Fathers thought it prudent to include
the right to petition the courts in the First Amendment
("Congress shall make no law
., prohibiting
, the right of the people
, to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.") The
right to petition the Government for a redress of grievances
is the cornerstone of all prisoners' right of access
to the courts.
The Due Process and Right to Jury Trial clauses
require the standard of persuasion upon which the prosecution
as the trier of facts must prove all the elements of
the offense to the jury, to be the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard.
These rights are codified (The process of compiling,
arranging, and systematizing the laws of a given jurisdiction
into an ordered code) in statute pursuant to Titles
18 and 28 of the United States Code Annotated (U.S.C.).
These rights are also codified in the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure (Fed. R. Crim. P.); Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ.P.); Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure (Fed. R. App. P.); Federal Rules
of Evidence (FRE).
These rights and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard,
are requirements
of law in a free society, and in the historic procedural
content of due process.
The United State Supreme Court reaffirmed the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard in the matter of Samuel
Winship, (written as) In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970). Justice Brennan stated:
"The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role
in the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is
the prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions
resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete
substance for the presumption of innocence-that bedrock
'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement
lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law.'
' [A] person accused of a crime
would be at a severe disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting
to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could be adjudged
guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the
same evidence as would suffice in a civil case.'
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has
this vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent
reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has
at stake interests of immense importance, both because
of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon
conviction and because of the certainty that he would
be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society
that values the good name and freedom of every individual
should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when
there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.
'Where
one party has at stake an interests of transcending
value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin
of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing
on the other party the burden of
persuading the
factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt."
Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty
unless the Government has borne the burden of
convincing the factfinder of his guilt. '
Lest
there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature
of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold
that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which his is charged." Id. At 363-364.
Based on the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, if
a defendant is convicted on a lesser standard of proof
in a criminal trial, e.g., (for example) the preponderance
of the evidence standard, he is entitled to appeal his
conviction to the Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. If the Court of Appeals denies him relief,
he is entitled to appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. If he is denied there he is entitled to correct
his judgment of conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255, (Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking
sentence). If he is a State prisoner, he is entitled
to correct his judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (State custody; remedies in Federal courts). 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (Writ of habeas corpus) is also available
to him pursuant to the "inadequate or ineffective"
language of § 2255 5.
The above show various statutes that a pre-1996 prisoner
could use to correct his judgment of conviction based
on constitutional violations that he challenged at trial,
sentence, and on direct appeal. But, Congress modified
these same statutes when Congress enacted the Antiterrorism
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996. The AEDPA
was enacted in response to the Oklahoma City bombing
and to limit the endless appeals of inmates on death
row. By enacting the AEDPA, Congress has severely limited
prisoners' ability to access the courts to address constitutional
violations.
In spite of the fact that objections to the constitutional
violations were made in a timely fashion, e.g., at trial,
sentence, and on direct appeal. But, the violations
were not ruled unconstitutional until after the prisoner's
direct appeal and initial §2255 were exhausted.
In that case, a prisoner must rely on "a new rule
of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 8.
By amending § 2255 and adding 8 into the language
of the AEDPA, Congress has effectively denied prisoner's
access to the courts in direct contravention with the
United States Constitution, Art. I, §9, cl. 2.
It is important to note that In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970), was made retroactive on collateral review
by the Supreme Court in 1972. See Reed v. Ross, 468
U.S. 1, 4-5 (1984).
The Supreme Court is fond of quoting Winship, and the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard in its various holdings.
As of this writing the Court has yet to hold that it
applies retroactively to the erroneous and unconstitutional
standards applied under the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (SRA), aka the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
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